

# THINKING WITH BALIBAR

A LEXICON OF CONCEPTUAL PRACTICE

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The terrorist and the policeman both come from the same basket. Revolution, legality—counter moves in the same game; forms of idleness at bottom identical. He plays his little game—so do you propagandists. But I don't play.

—The Professor in Joseph Conrad's *The Secret Agent* (1907)

## CONTRE-/COUNTER-

*Bernard E. Harcourt*

Is it possible to imagine a concept that is so productive that it leads us beyond the ordinary play of “countermoves in the same game”? Is it conceivable that the prefix *contre-* or, in English, “counter-” could overcome the opposition from which it is born and generate a fully autonomous conceptual form? Not in the Kantian or Hegelian sense of a synthesis that resolves an antinomic opposition (not the least of which because the prefix *contre-* functions differently than the prefix “anti-” does) but rather as an original counterpoint that itself becomes so powerful as to liberate itself from the oppositional relationship and transform itself into a freestanding concept, intervention, or even mode of governmentality.

I suspect this is what Étienne Balibar aspired to in his essay in *Equaliberty* when he urged us to institute “a counterpower” to the force of conventional government and administration.<sup>1</sup> Such a counterpower would have to become greater than simply resistance to governmental power. In order for it to achieve its full potential, it would need to liberate itself from its originary opposition and transform itself into an autonomous, self-referential, fully articulated form of governance. This alone could guarantee that the *contre-* move develop into its own independent mode of governing. It is an ambitious ideal but a realizable goal. At least, it is one that we have witnessed in our own lifetimes—though in an inverted way. But then again, we do not always have total control over our concepts. Often, they escape us. Sometimes they come back to haunt us.

A model for this concept-making—for this conceptual fabrication—can be

found in Joseph Conrad's novel *The Secret Agent*, which serves as the epigraph to this essay. The character of the Professor in that novel had strapped on him, at all times, a flask of explosives and carried a small detonator in his hand—ready to blow himself and everyone around him to bits. By means of these devices, he claimed to have gotten past the conventional opposition between revolutionaries and the police. He claimed to have overcome the mere “game” of moves and countermoves and reached a higher—and more threatening—stage. He claimed to have transformed his reactivity into a pure force. Into perfection.

Readers will recall that it was the figure of the Professor, more so than Conrad's other characters, who inspired later anarchists and some terrorists, prominently among them the Unabomber, Ted Kaczynski. Conrad, who always labeled his characters for us, referred to the Professor as “the perfect anarchist.”<sup>2</sup> And what exactly, one may ask, was the ambition of this “perfect anarchist”? “What is it you are after yourself?” his comrade Ossipon would ask him with indignation. “A perfect detonator,” Conrad writes, in a response he describes as “the peremptory answer.”<sup>3</sup>

One can infer from Conrad's novel that the Professor himself had begun as an anarchist caught in the counter-moves that he himself disparaged—caught in the play, in the game, in the parry. One can assume that the Professor was originally part of that dance or that judo of counter-moves. But the implication is clear: the Professor had gone beyond the mere tit for tat and had achieved instead a more *perfect* form of anarchism. What made this the most perfect or peremptory anarchist state was precisely getting beyond the *contre-* move to another level—a level that was autonomous of the opposition itself and, in that way, absolute. It was a pure state, independent from the back and forth between the revolutionaries and the police.

Because of the explosives that he strapped on himself at all times, the Professor remarked, “they know . . . I shall never be arrested. The game isn't good enough for any policeman of them all. To deal with a man like me you require sheer, naked, inglorious heroism.”<sup>4</sup> The Professor may have sounded almost delirious, and self-aggrandizing for sure, but the Professor had achieved something unique: he had gotten beyond the ordinary relation of opposition.

The Professor ultimately has the last scene of the *Secret Agent*. After the counter-intelligence and counter-espionage is over—after Winnie Verloc's story has reached, in Conrad's words, “its anarchistic end of utter desolation, madness, and despair,”<sup>5</sup> after her brother's accidental explosion at Greenwich Station, her own murder of her husband, and her suicide—it is the Professor who closes the book—“the incorruptible Professor,” as Conrad adds. Conrad closes:

He was a force. His thoughts caressed the images of ruin and destruction. He walked frail, insignificant, shabby, miserable—and terrible in the simplicity of his idea calling madness and despair to the regeneration of the world. Nobody looked at him. He passed on unsuspected and deadly, like a pest in the street of full men.<sup>6</sup>

The Professor had become sheer force, ruin, and destruction. He had overcome his opposition to the system to become something as deadly as the pest. He had achieved the full effect of the *contre-* move. Not a very attractive overcoming—but as I mentioned, we do not always have total control over our conceptual moves—but a remarkable one.

A similar conceptual movement runs through the writings of Balibar and through much of Michel Foucault's thought, as well. A good illustration in Foucault's work is from an early passage in his inaugural lesson, on April 2, 1981, of the Louvain lectures titled *Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling: The Function of Avowal in Justice*. At the close of that inaugural lecture, Foucault evokes, as the very framework or core of his interventions to come, the notion of a "counter-positivism" that, he explains, "is not the contrary of positivism, but rather its counterpoint." The full passage reads as follows:

We often speak of the recent domination of science or of the technical uniformity of the modern world. Let's say that this is the question of "positivism" in the Comtian sense, or perhaps it would be better to associate the name of Saint-Simon to this theme. In order to situate my analysis, *I would like to evoke here a counter-positivism that is not the opposite of positivism but rather its counterpoint*. It would be characterized by astonishment before the very ancient multiplication and proliferation of truth-telling, and the dispersal of regimes of veridiction in societies such as ours.<sup>7</sup>

The notion of counter-positivism conveys something different than "antipositivism" does because Foucault actually embraces a positivistic sensibility toward the proliferation of truth-telling forms. There is a history here, a truthful one. Foucault is tracing a history of truth telling regimes—more specifically, of regimes of veridiction and of speaking truth and, in the larger arc of his years at the Collège de France, of the different bases (legal, historical, political, economic) that ground claims of truth over time.

Foucault's method, then, is not antipositivist. It is instead a "counterpoint": it deploys positivistic sensibilities against narrow positivism. Most importantly, his method culminates in a philosophical intervention that is autonomous of positivism and of antipositivism, that does not depend on either, and that no longer responds or relates merely to the opposition—it becomes its own autonomous

method: a pure philosophical method, a way of seeing the world. It overcomes positivism while always indexing it.

Foucault's counter-positivism, in the end, is a full-fledged method, fully detached from any dispute with positivism. In fact, it is perhaps the most important compass for deciphering the Louvain lectures—which is why, incidentally, the passage ended up on the *quatrième de couverture*, where it remains in the French edition as the most significant words of those lectures. It is the point of perfection.

The *contre-* move—by which I mean, to be clear, the movement of thought and practice, the action that is captured by adding the prefix *contre-* or “counter-” to another concept—is a conceptual factory. Its generative power is remarkable. It is not so much a concept itself but instead the creator, the producer of concepts. The *contre-* move produces rich, constructed mental representations. It practically defines the distinction between concept and notion: nothing here is intuitive and immediate, as are notions; on the contrary, the *contre-* move is complex, constructed, and stabilized over time. It is the intellectual work product. It is the infrastructure to myriad new concepts. In fact, if one looks in the *Oxford English Dictionary*, for instance, the entry for “counter” becomes a litany, a catalog, an enumeration of counter-concepts: “Counter-address; counter-advise; counter-affirm; counter-ambush; counter-avouch; counter-beat; counter-bid; counter-bore,”<sup>8</sup> and I am still only at the beginning of the *B*'s. Each term with its own early etymological use and history.

Foucault made use of the *contre-* move extensively—in fact, one could argue that it was one of his most productive devices, a veritable conceptual-production technique. Nietzsche did, too, referring for instance to “art” as the “counter-movement” against nihilism.<sup>9</sup>

In conversation with Balibar, during his seminar on Foucault at Columbia University in fall 2015, we began to identify and catalog the occurrences of the *contre-* move in Foucault's work, including the concept of *contre-pouvoir* in his debate with Maoists;<sup>10</sup> the concept of “counter-history” in “*Society Must Be Defended*”<sup>11</sup>; the concept of “counter-conduct” in *Security, Territory, Population* or, in the same lectures, the concepts of “counter-society” (“In some of these communities there was a counter-society aspect, a carnival aspect, overturning social relations and hierarchy”<sup>12</sup>); or the concept of “counter-justice” again in his debate with Maoists,<sup>13</sup> of the “counter-weight” to governmentality in the *Birth of Biopolitics*,<sup>14</sup> of the idea of psychoanalysis as a “counter-science” in *The Order of Things*.<sup>15</sup> Throughout his writings, his lectures, his interviews, Foucault



constantly returned to the prefix *contre-* to create concepts, to fashion new and autonomous ideas.

And it is of central importance in reading Balibar. There are, in his *Equality* essays and many other brilliant writings, multiple deployments of the *contre-* move: Balibar speaks of “counter-racism”<sup>16</sup> and counter-populism—as Michel Feher has discussed, there is the “counter-city” and the “counterpower.”<sup>17</sup> Then, there is also this important *contre-* move, which may fall on the darker side of the ledger:

The crisis of the national-social state correlative to globalization and the re-proletarianization that constitutes both its result and one of its objects from the side of the dominant classes (of financial capitalism) gives rise to a whole series of national or international political initiatives that relate to what could be called a *preventative counterrevolution*, even more than neoimperialism.<sup>18</sup>

There is also the *contre-* move that counters the counter-revolution with a “counter-counterrevolution,” setting things somewhat more straight for the resisters and the disobedients:

The whole question is whether a policy of this kind, more or less deliberate but perfectly observable in its effects, which combines financial, military, and humanitarian aspects and which I believe can be characterized as preventive counterrevolution, elicits a revolutionary response, or, if you like, a counter-counterrevolution, according to the schema of “going to extremes” that was largely shared among Marxist and Leninist representations of the socialist transition after the experience of the insurrections of the nineteenth century.<sup>19</sup>

In his culminating seminar in fall 2015, Balibar proposed that Foucault had developed a “counter-politics”—in contrast to *le politique*, the apolitical, or even the unpolitical. Following that, at a conference at the University Paris—Est Créteil on “Assujettissement et subjectivation” on June 1, 2016, Balibar developed his *contre-* move further, suggesting that the central element of truth-telling in Foucault’s work—of *parrhesia*, of veridiction and all its associated forms of diction—is a form of *contre-diction* and *contre-conduite*, effectively placing the element of the *contre-* move at the very center of Foucault’s thought. Balibar pointed us in particular to the *quatrième de page* of both Volumes 2 and 3 of the *History of Sexuality*, which reproduce the following quotation by René Char:

L’histoire des hommes est la longue succession des synonymes d’un même vocable. Y contredire est un devoir.<sup>20</sup>

To *contre*-dict is a duty: for Balibar, this notion of parrhesiastic contradiction has within it the seeds of a counter-democratic principle, not in Pierre Rosanvallon's sense but as was exercised by certain parrhesiasts such as Socrates or Diogenes. This reflects an element of the *counter-majoritarian* in Foucault's work. And by means of the *contre*-move, Foucault's intervention and turn to parrhesia becomes an autonomous, independent theory based on a "contradiction" that is indexed but that we barely see.

In an essay titled "In Praise of Counter-Conduct," Arnold Davidson underscores how so many of the forms of resistance that we admire in Foucault's writings take us back to the concept of "counter-conduct":

In a series of remarkable formulas concerning freedom, Foucault speaks of the "insubordination of freedom," the "rebelliousness of the will and the intransitivity of freedom," the "art of voluntary inservitude" and of "deliberative indocility" (Foucault, 2001b: 1056; 1990: 39). All of these phrases belong to the semantic field of counter-conduct and make evident the double ethical and political scope of this counter-conduct.<sup>21</sup>

One can hear, in Davidson's essay, a kind of admiration for the concept of counter-conduct. But it is important to emphasize that the *contre*-move is not always or necessarily progressive. As with concepts such as solidarity<sup>22</sup> or interior frontiers,<sup>23</sup> there is an equivocal nature to counter-concepts. They, too, can go a bit all over the place—and be deployed against the interests of a progressive agenda. This is reflected in what Robespierre would refer to as the "counter-revolutionary,"<sup>24</sup> or, depending on any given political interpretation, what Rosanvallon would refer to as "Counter-Democracy." I am here again in Balibar's *Equaliberty*—or rather, in his footnotes—always inescapably in Balibar's work.

Many of us bear an almost romantic attachment to the counter-practice itself. It feels so intimately linked to notions of disobedience, resistance, and countering power. But it is important not to get carried away.

Let me set forth as systematically as possible my central thesis. There is a particularity to the *contre*-move that distinguishes it from other political devices or mechanisms. It does not function like a dialectic. It is an opposition that leads not to a synthesis but instead to a stage of "perfection," in Conrad's terms, that (1) merely indexes its former counter-partner and (2) becomes a fully independent concept, all to itself, that does not incorporate its opposition and is no longer a reaction against anything. This is very different than the way that concepts generally work. It is markedly different, for instance, from the Nietzschean idea

that concepts are the cumulative effect of dead metaphors, or that only when its history is forgotten can something become a concept.

It may be useful, then, to delineate three dimensions of the *contre-* move.

The first dimension distinguishes it from the more classic or simple opposition associated with the prefix “anti-.” Adding the prefix “anti-” serves only to defeat or eradicate its object directly. For instance, antiterrorism aims to eliminate terrorism by stamping it out, in contrast to counter-terrorism, which uses the logic and strategies of terrorism to undermine it. The *contre-* move is more internal: It engages in a play, a movement, a dance with its object, using the force of the object against itself, in order to get beyond that game. It uses the energy of the object, and the internal logic of the object, to defeat it. It starts in a game with the object—as in chess, or fencing, or martial arts—but then transcends it.

There is, in this sense, some proximity between the *contre-* move and the term “against”—as in Paul Feyerabend’s *Against Method*, or in *Against Prediction*.<sup>25</sup> “Against” is closer to “counter-” than to “anti-” insofar as it attempts to develop a new method in the oppositional work rather than simply to defeat its object.

In any event, the *contre-* move is different from the “anti-” move.<sup>26</sup> Returning to the example of security, specifically of counter-insurgency: Counterinsurgency uses the internal logic of Maoist insurgency to defeat the insurrection. It adopts and accepts the logic—in fact it fully embraces the logic—but it tries to do it better, to reappropriate it, to redeploy it even more aggressively. It does not rest on the idea that there would be two opposing views that are contrary to each other in a dialectical confrontation. Instead, it burrows into the logic and deploys it against its opponent.

The *contre-* move differs as well from the Socratic dialectic (the testing of an opposing view), the Kantian model of dialectics (thesis-antithesis-synthesis), and the Hegelian method (abstract-negative-concrete). It differs, in its very foundation, from an Adornian negative dialectics. It differs as well from Marx’s dialectical materialism—which rests on a notion of direct opposition, as expressed in his *Capital*:

My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel, the life-process of the human brain, i.e. the process of thinking, which, under the name of “the Idea,” he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demi-urgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of “the Idea.” With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought.<sup>27</sup>

To be sure, there is of course a family resemblance among all these forms of opposition. Foucault was keenly aware of this and in fact suggested as much in an interview discussing what he called “countereffects,” in which he added: “I dare not use the word *dialectics*—but this comes rather close to it.”<sup>28</sup> The *contre-* move “comes rather close” to a dialectic but is not the same. It also comes close to the “anti-” move but, again, differs. One can hear that as well in Foucault’s writing, with passages for instance in *Security, Territory, Population* that read as follows: “The first element of anti-pastoral or pastoral counter-conduct is asceticism.”<sup>29</sup> Here and elsewhere, Foucault is struggling to pin down the conceptual move, using the term “anti-pastoral struggles” interchangeably with “pastoral counter-conducts” but trying to correct and replace the first with the second.<sup>30</sup>

A second dimension concerns the *internal* logic of the *contre-* move. It is almost an imminent form of critique: the object that is being opposed is taken as such, it already exists fully, and the *contre-* move effectively goes into the object to oppose it. Notice how the *Oxford English Dictionary* defines the term: “Done, directed, or acting against, in opposition to, as a rejoinder or reply to another thing of the same kind *already made or in existence*.”<sup>31</sup>

Davidson points directly to this notion of immanence when he writes that, as in the interiority of the relationship between points of resistance and relations of power,

in *Security, Territory, Population*, Foucault also emphasizes the nonexteriority, the immanent relation, of conduct and counter-conduct. The fundamental elements of the counter-conduct analysed by Foucault are not absolutely external to the conduct imposed by Christian pastoral power. Conduct and counter-conduct share a series of elements that can be utilized and reutilized, reimplanted, reinserted, taken up in the direction of reinforcing a certain mode of conduct or of creating and recreating a type of counter-conduct.<sup>32</sup>

There is, Davidson explains, a “tactical immanence” of counter-conduct to conduct. Counter-conduct is not “simply a passive underside, a merely negative or reactive phenomenon, a kind of disappointing after-effect.”<sup>33</sup> In the words of Foucault, counter-conducts are not “les phénomènes en creux.”<sup>34</sup> There is a “productivity of counter-conduct which goes beyond the purely negative act of disobedience.”<sup>35</sup> It is in this sense that, for Davidson, “the notion of counter-conduct adds an explicitly ethical component to the notion of resistance.”<sup>36</sup> As a methodological matter, the “counter-” element of “counter-conduct” works in a similar way as “resistance” to power does: as something internal, that does not reach

beyond, that is not a gap or absence. Foucault talks about counter-conduct that is “used against and to short-circuit, as it were, the pastorate.”<sup>37</sup> Notice the use of the term “against” and the idea of short-circuiting. The short circuit is tied to the internal dimension of the *contre-* move. It uses the circuit, the flow of electricity against itself. Davidson comes back to this in regard to homosexuality:

Foucault describes these relations with the same expression, *court-circuit*, that he had used to describe religious counter-conduct: “these relations create a short-circuit, and introduce love where there should be law, rule, habit” (Foucault, 2001f: 983).<sup>38</sup>

A third dimension, and perhaps most important, is the ultimate emancipation of the *contre-* move, which goes beyond its oppositional object, is liberated from it, becomes autonomous. At that point, it is no longer “counter-.” It is more like the Professor in Conrad’s *The Secret Agent*: outside the game, outside the dance, beyond the counter-moves in the same game. But it always indexes the original opposing object. The Professor is perhaps the “perfect anarchist,” but he is still an *anarchist*.

When the counter-move works, it gives rise to something that is neither the opposite nor even the dance partner but instead is perfectly autonomous and self-sufficient—a concept that functions all on its own. Counter-conduct is no longer conduct that resists something but conduct that has become its own form, a pure form of force, or disobedience, or of resistance.

Let me offer a more tangible or concrete illustration: the example of jujutsu (or Ju-Jitsu or Jiu-Jitsu), a form of judo. (I must emphasize up front that I am not a fan of martial arts, but I do believe the illustration is instructive here). As I see it, jujutsu is the perfect illustration of the *contre-* move.

“Ju” stands for pliable or yielding to another. “Jutsu” means “techne” or “art.” Together, the term signifies the art of yielding to the other’s force. “The word jujutsu may be translated freely as ‘the art of gaining victory by yielding or pliancy.’”<sup>39</sup>

The central idea of jujutsu is to use someone’s own force against him or her. Rather than confront the other with one’s force, the idea is to turn the force of the opponent into one’s own weapon and use it against the opponent. In other words, to turn one’s opponent’s energy against the opponent, rather than trying to oppose that energy directly. In an article from 1887, “Jujutsu and the Origins of Judo,” the authors explain that: “Its main principle [is] not to match strength with strength, but to gain victory by yielding to strength.” And the first principle of the art: “not to resist an opponent, but to gain victory by pliancy.”<sup>40</sup>

I would identify this as that first moment of the *contre-* move: to parry, to

block, to ward off by a corresponding move. But what I would suggest is that forms of jujutsu as judo transcend that parry. The philosophy of jujutsu is that of the counter-move: to use the force of the attack and to transform it into something else, something that is neither an attack nor a block.

When the counter-move can exist on its own, without responding to its counter, always perhaps indexing it but fully unmoored, detached, independent, above its counter, doing what it does without responding to its counter, countering without reference to its counter—that, I take it, is the final productive moment of *contre-*.

The darkest illustration of the *contre-* move—one that demonstrates well its fullest potential—lies right before our own eyes in the United States. Over the course of the past four decades or more, a new form of governmentality characterized by counterinsurgency strategies has come to dominate our government. Developed as a counter-move that drew extensively on Maoist ideas of insurgency, this new form of governmentality has liberated itself from its oppositional object and become a form of governing *despite the absence of any domestic insurgency*. It has become an autonomous form of government.<sup>41</sup>

Since 9/11, the United States has undergone a dramatic transformation in the way it carries itself abroad and governs itself at home. Long in the making—at least since the colonial wars abroad and the domestic turmoil of the 1960s—this historic transformation has come about in three waves. First, militarily: in Vietnam and now in Afghanistan and Iraq, US military strategy shifted importantly from a conventional model of large-scale battlefield warfare to unconventional forms of counterinsurgency warfare. Second, in foreign affairs: as the counterinsurgency paradigm took hold militarily, US foreign policy began to mirror the core principles of unconventional warfare—total information awareness, targeted eradication of the radical minority, and psychological pacification of the masses. Third, at home: with the increased militarization of police forces, irrational fear of Muslims, and overenforcement of antiterrorism laws, the United States has begun to domesticate the counterinsurgency and to apply it to its own population.

The result has been radical: the emergence of a domestic counterinsurgency model of government, imposed on American soil, in the absence of any domestic insurgency. The counterinsurgency has liberated itself from its oppositional object to become a new and radical form of government. It is a *counter-*insurgency without an insurgency, an autonomous form of unconventional warfare unmoored from reality.

This illustrates perfectly the *contre-* move: Born in an opposition, it soon

exceeds it. Neither inherently good nor bad, it can take us in multiple directions. It is not thesis, antithesis, synthesis. It is not “anti-.” There is no inherent necessity to these logical steps. Not with counter, also. Counter can fail. But when it succeeds, it tends to be a powerful device, born of contestation.

In the end, the concept of the counter-move may bring us to the heart of resistance and disobedience, as well. It might be possible to develop a theory of the counter-move as one decisive form of critique. To draw on the energy and positivity of needing to counter. This is perhaps the counter-counter-revolution that Balibar had in mind in *Equaliberty*.

It is possible that, today, more than ever, we need to “go counter.” Both in the sense of counter-play and in the sense of exceeding the ideology we counter, to achieve something autonomous. This is what happens when jujutsu becomes an art form. When the Counterreformation becomes something greater than a response to the Protestant reformation, but instead a new form of governmentality. When counterpositivism becomes a philosophical method that need not refer back to positivism anymore. When the Counterrevolution becomes a form of governmentality in the absence of any insurgency or revolution. Or when, in Joseph Conrad’s book, the Professor becomes himself the “perfect anarchist” who has gotten past the play of the game of counter-moves. This is perhaps a model for resistance.

## APPENDIX

My ambition and hope had been to write this essay with Étienne Balibar. We had often spoken about the idea but, as it so often happens, moved on to other collaborations. I will close then here with a memorable email from Balibar.

Cher Bernard,

Hier soir ma femme et moi étions à la très belle mise en scène de textes de Paul Celan que dit Nicolas Bouchaud, un des grands acteurs français actuels, au Théâtre du Rond-Point, et donc j’ai entendu (et ensuite retrouvé dans le texte) le passage suivant de son célèbre discours de réception du prix Georg Büchner en 1960 (connu sous le titre “Le méridien”):

“Après toutes les paroles prononcées à la tribune (c’est ici l’échafaud sanglant), quelle parole! C’est la contre-parole, c’est la parole qui casse le ‘fil,’ la parole qui n’est plus la révérence faite ‘aux badauds et à l’histoire sur ses grands chevaux,’ c’est un acte de liberté. C’est un pas.”

Le mot allemand est “das Gegenwort,” et il s’agit d’une allusion à l’exclamation de Lucile Desmoulins au pied de la guillotine, après l’exécution de son mari, provocation

destinée à lui permettre d'être exécutée à son tour pour le "rejoindre" dans la mort, dans la pièce de Georg Büchner, "La mort de Danton").

A mettre en réserve, pour notre essai à venir . . . (Foucault peut-être connaissait ce discours, qui a été édité d'abord de façon confidentielle en 1961 puis réédité en allemand en 1968, mais surtout traduit en français en 1967 par le poète André du Bouchet dans le premier numéro de la revue *L'Ephémère*, tout à fait le genre de choses que Foucault devait regarder; mais de toute façon l'important est la rencontre des mots).

Cf. Paul Celan, *Le Méridien et autres proses*, Edition bilingue, traduit de l'allemand et annoté par Jean Launay, Editions du Seuil 2002, page 63).

Bonnes fêtes et bonne année! Amitié, Étienne

## NOTES

1. Étienne Balibar, *Equaliberty: Political Essays*, trans. James Ingram (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2013), 284.
2. Joseph Conrad, *The Secret Agent*, ed. John Lyon (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008), 71.
3. Conrad, *Secret Agent*, 51.
4. Conrad, *Secret Agent*, 49.
5. Conrad, *Secret Agent*, 233.
6. Conrad, *Secret Agent*, 227.
7. Michel Foucault, *Mal faire, dire vrai: La fonction de l'aveu en justice*, ed. Fabienne Brion and Bernard E. Harcourt (Louvain, Belgium: Presses Universitaires de Louvain, 2012), 10.
8. *Oxford English Dictionary Online*, s.v. "counter," <https://www.oed.com>.
9. Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1967), Section 794, p. 419.
10. Michel Foucault, "Sur la justice populaire: Débats avec les Maos," in *Dits et Écrits*, vol. 1, 1954–1969 (Paris: Gallimard, 2001), 1234.
11. Michel Foucault, "*Society Must Be Defended*": *Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975–76*, ed. Mauro Bertani and Alessandro Fontana (New York: Picador, 2002), 79.
12. Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977–78* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 211–12, quoted in Foucault, "*Society*," 29.
13. Michel Foucault, "Sur la justice," 1235.
14. Michel Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978–1979*, ed. Michel Senellart, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Picador, 2010), 137.



15. Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 379.
16. Balibar, *Equaliberty*, 205.
17. Balibar, *Equaliberty*, 284.
18. Balibar, *Equaliberty*, 159.
19. Balibar, *Equaliberty*, 159.
20. Michel Foucault, *Histoire de la sexualité*, vol. 2, *L'usage des plaisirs* (Paris: Gallimard, 1984), back cover; Michel Foucault, *Histoire de la sexualité*, vol. 3, *Le souci de soi* (Paris: Gallimard, 1984), back cover; Michel Foucault, *Histoire de la sexualité*, vol. 4, *Les aveux de la chair* (Paris: Gallimard, 2018), back cover.
21. Arnold Davidson, "In Praise of Counter-Conduct," *History of the Human Sciences*, 24, no. 4 (2011): 30.
22. See Jacques Lezra, "Relation," this volume.
23. See Ann Laura Stoler, "Interior Frontiers," this volume.
24. Balibar, *Equaliberty*, 316n7.
25. Paul Feyerabend, *Against Method* (New York: Verso, 2010); Bernard E. Harcourt, *Against Prediction: Profiling, Policing, and Punishing in an Actuarial Age* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).
26. In this regard, I would contest Balibar's suggestion that Foucault's relation to Marx could be properly described as "anti-Marx," as Balibar titles his essay "L'anti-Marx de Michel Foucault." Especially in relation to the Foucault of the early 1970s, as I have argued, we are facing much more of a *contre*-Marx than an anti-Marx. The 1972 and 1973 lectures are determinative in this regard. Insofar as Foucault supplements, but does not displace, the accumulation of capital by the accumulation of docile bodies, what we face is a *contre*-move—at least in this most *Marxisant* period of Foucault. See Michel Foucault, *Théories et institutions pénales: Cours au Collège de France. 1971–1972*, ed. Bernard E. Harcourt (Paris: Gallimard, 2015), 262 ("Le contre-marxisme de Foucault n'est pas un anti-marxisme").
27. Karl Marx, "Afterword to the Second German Edition," in *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*, ed. Frederick Engels, trans. Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling (Moscow: Progress, 1965).
28. Michel Foucault, "Sex, Power and the Politics of Identity," in *Ethics: Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984*, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: New Press, 1999), 167.
29. Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977–78* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 208.
30. See also Foucault, "Sex, Power, and the Politics of Identity," 204.
31. *Oxford English Dictionary Online*, s.v. "counter-." <https://www.oed.com>.
32. Davidson, "Praise," 27.
33. Davidson, "Praise," 27.

34. Michel Foucault, *Histoire de la sexualité*, vol. 1, *La volonté de savoir* (Paris: Gallimard, 1976), 126.
35. Davidson, "Praise," 27.
36. Davidson, "Praise," 28.
37. Foucault, *Security*, 213, quoted in Davidson, "Praise," 29.
38. Davidson, "Praise," 33.
39. Jigorō Kanō and T. Lindsay, "Jujutsu and the Origins of Judo," *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan* 15 (1887).
40. Kanō and Lindsay, "Jujutsu."
41. See a detailed elaboration of this argument, see Bernard E. Harcourt, *The Counterrevolution: How Our Government Went to War against Its Own Citizens* (New York: Basic Books, 2018).

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